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3. The Progress Of Political Liberalism 
Political liberalism was first stabilized in Great Britain 
and tne~"TTnited *"tfat.fifi. Although the British avoide~d many of 
the difficulties that beset the Continent immediately following 
Napoleon Bonaparte's downfall in 1815, they had succumbed tem-
porarily to the spirit of reaction. The Industrial Revolution 
brought to England considerable social discontent which was ac-
c^fff*:fia?ted~™^y~Tlfeeconomic difficulties of the postwar years. 
Radical agitators insisted that evolutionary reform was not 
possible in an England where the masses were not genuinely rep-
resented in Parliament. When the malcontents adopted extremist 
measures — strikes, mass meetings, and riots — the propertied 
and politically effective classes supported a reactionary min-
istry. 
In 1817, when a crowd gathered at a mass—meeting destroyed 
some jKEQPerty. a panicky government was persuaded to bap public 
iqeet.fngjs a n d suspend the writ of habeas corpus. This action 
infringed on rights precious to Englishmen for generations and 
led one contemporary observer to refer to them as the "libertj-
cide acts." They were followed in 1819 by the "Peterloo Mas-
SacreLL_near Manchester, where soldiers bore down on a crowd of 
60,000 assembled to hear orators discuss parliamentary reform. 
In the ensuing melee eleven people were killed and 400 wounded. 
After an investigation Parliament saw fit to enact a code of 
* John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 
1868), pp. 22-31, 33~"~6, 101-106, 181-194, 197-199, 202-206, 
209-218, 219-220, 222-223. 
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repressive laws severely restrictive of traditional English 
liberties. Repeated deeds of violence and conspiracy on the 
part of the radical reformers, however, enabled the Tory party 
to remain in control and for a time the cause of political re-
form in England suffered. 
Eventually S.ome,-.British,,C01IServa.ti ves we.re prepared „±o 
make concessions. The peculiar political genius of the jyaper 
;clussgg-",in--->Engl'and has been their readiness to note and then 
act to rel i,e_yjg.._the discontent of the masses. This partially 
explains why modern Britain has 'usually been aBie to escape the 
violent upheavals such as have plagued nations on the other 
side of the English Channel, The first important concession 
was the repeal of the.Combination laws. This legislation, en-
acted during the anti-Jacobin hysteria at the turn of the cen-
tury, had outlawed working-class organizations. Its repeal in 
1824 now opened the way for British trade-union activity, _£arj 
liament.ary ..grants of political equal i.ty^is. p r o t e s t ant, dissenters 
in 1828, and to Roman Catholics i n 1829, .marked "a" continuing 
liberal trend,, But these concessions were won frequently only 
after threats of disorder and violence, and thus they lost much 
of the good will which they might have inspired, British rad-
ical reformers were still dissatisfied and continued their 
agitation. 
Public opinion in England did not remain unaffected by the 
revolutionary events of 1830 on the Continent, The British 
counterpart was the RflXoxa ****** *l 1 nf 1R^-9. designed to correct 
the political ineaujit-*•***-*** inherent. i,n,,..tha, disproportionate sys-
fajj-Pt representation in Parliament. Since medieval times 
English counties (shires) and certain towns (boroughs) had the 
right to send representatives to sit in the Houise of Commons, 
Such had served the needs of an earlier day, but by the nine-
teenth century some of the boroughs had lost population to the 
extent that little remained but a house, a park, or as in the 
case of Old Sarum, a deserted hill. Yet, because the seats had 
not been redistributed, these "rotten boroughs" still enjoyed 
the right of representation while rising industrial centers 
such as Manchester or Birmingham were denied it. Furthermore, 
in most constituencies property qualifications for voting en-
abled the most important landlord to name the candidates and 
control the elections to Parliament, These "pocket boroughs" 
were equally a travesty on fair representative government."" 
Finally, the fact that im^'arTy-.nineteenth century Britain less 
than_.foux per,,.._cen.t_of___the population enjoyed the right to vote 
made corruption of the elecfTve process a relatively easy matter. 
Parliamentary reform had been urged in Englfcmd as early as 
the eighteenth century, but the twin spectres of Jacobinism and 
Bonapartism frightened conservatives and precluded reform until 
the liberal surge of 1830. FjcjbflXJt Q^^aeass in the cities, 
anxious to weaken the control exercised by landowning country 
squires, at length jo_ined with other liberal elements in propa-
gandising for reform ~~~Tn IJBJI a W h i g ministry. anxious to 
gain greater popular support, went before Parliament with a 
l/**zZy^- fad*-**. *J-a *^**^^^3^t^^L£<«6ss^xZi^»i^^«^'tf^«&- ybtAMw^U*™-*^**^ 
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measure which now had a chance for enactment. It proposed to 
redistribute the seats in the House of Commons more nearly on 
the basis of population and give the vote to the middle class. 
Lord John Russell (1792-1878), a member of the Cabinet, 
introduced the Reform Bill in an able speech. He reminded the 
House of Commons that the English constitution excluded taxa-
tion without representation. Moreover, he declared: 
The House of Commons. as it now subsists, does not 
represent the, people of England. The confidence"~of the" 
country in the construction and constitution of the 
House is gone. If, therefore, the question is one of 
right, right is in favour of Reform; if it be a question 
of reason, reason is in favour of Reform; if it be a 
question of policy and expediency, policy and expedi-
ency are in favour of Reform, 
He carefully avoided advocating "*1iv'**r'*''":.i1, manhood suffrage. 
"I contend," he assured the members, "that it is proper to give 
the real property and real respectability of the...cities and 
towns the right of voting for members of Parliament." Politi-
cal power under the cons t i tut ion" was* ~sT;iTT*To be based on prop-
erty, but in the mind of Russell and his fellow Whigs the term 
prfljaext-y should now—be- interpreted to include the interests of 
the business community. 
The conservative Tory opposition fought manfully to defeat 
this bill. Its passage was delayed until the Whigs persuaded 
the king to threaten the appointment of enough additional peers 
to pack the House of Lords and thus insure favorable action. 
At this threat conservative opposition collapsed and in 1832 
the bill became law. One Tory sadly complained that "the four 
M's, the Monarch, the Ministry, the Members, and the Multitude 
[are] all against us." What he did not realize was that the 
measure probably saved Enc1. nnd^fjrnm revolutionary turmoil such 
as was to rack the Continent in 1848. 
The Reform Bill of 1832 did little to promote democracy as 
that creed was understood in the nineteenth century. Itsuaost 
significant accomplishment was the ending of the political 
monopoly held since 1689 by the agricultural landowxiTng_classes. 
"A"f~~their side rose a new oligarchy — the factory owners~~and~~ 
the middle class generally - In the last analysis the govern-
ment of Great Britain was still under the control of a minority, 
albeit a different minority. The working class urban population 
and agricultural labor still had no direct voice in the govern-
ment which now was more representative but not yet democratic. 
The oligarchic nature of the new system is seen in Par-
1 iamenCS^~cold reception of the" nronosek I'Peopie's Charter^" a 
document drawn up in 1838 by London artisans and supported by 
the industrial population of northern England. The_J"*hajrt2ists, 
as these energetic agitators were called, drafted a six-poTht 
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program demanding universal rmnhnnri gmffyapre t ejiaal^eJLectoral 
districts, the secret ballot, annual elections of Parliament, 
"^ jar ig^fi^.--mem hers n f P a r 1 ia,*l?nt:r anH" the removal of property 
qualifications *f*r seats in Parliament " olTTEr^e- difieFent ' 
occasions between 1838 and 1848, Parliament rejected these 
propositions, CJharJ^tsja, as a democratic mass movement, jyaded 
in failure as the government proved intransigent, British 
workers turned increasingly to the trade-union movement, and 
for nearly two decades the surface of political life was rel-
atively untroubled in England. Yet, in the long run, five of 
the six points listed by the Chartists were^_adopted. 
Another result of the Reform Bill of 1832 was that it_pro-
v 1 ded assistance to the manufacturers ill their campaign against 
~ the _Cojpa-Laj£S. These were tariffs designed to protect agricul-
tural interests in Britain against foreign imports. The factory 
owners desired to cheapen the price of bread so as to lessen 
workers 5 pressure for higher wages, but this ran counter to the 
interests of the landed gentry. After a bitter Parliamentary 
battle the free-trade interests won a victory in the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846. This was not so much a triumph for 
political liberalism as it was for economic "liberalism, but the 
rigiBultant "decline in bread prices probably weakened lower class 
support for radical reform. 
In this epoch of reform in England two other parliamentary 
acts should be mentioned — the abolition of slavery within the 
empire and the....improvement of municipal government in English" 
cities and towns. After reformers had succeeded in getting the 
prohibition of the slave trade in 1807, they continued their 
efforts to abolish slavery. In this they were aided by a growing 
favorable response from the public at large and by the decline 
of West Indian planter influence in Parliament. The act of 
abolition provided that after 1834 slavery should cease wherever 
waved the Union Jack, and the sincerity of the British 
public is seen in the fact that they contributed fc20,000,000 to 
compensate the slave owners for their losses. In 1835, a long 
overdue reorganization of town government was provided. In 
most cities municipal government was in the hands of an unrep-
resentative oligarchy. The Reform Bill of 1832 had given more 
townspeople the vote, and they straightway brought pressure to 
eliminate the corrupt and inefficient governments which con-
trolled local communities. Parliament enacted the Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1835, which deprived a large number of the 
smaller boroughs of their municipal charters, placed the re-
mainder (except London) under a council chosen by the resident 
taxpayers, and then made this council responsible for the whole 
government of the borough. This reform did away with corruption 
and inefficiency almost entirely, and provided the fundamental 
organization of British municipal government to the present day. 
In the twenty years following 1848 liberal principles of 
self-government were extended to Canada and later to other col-
onies , More EngJ ' g^ffn "inH h p p n gxanied j~he right to votp^ but 
nojt^nti*l^the"TReform Act of 1867 were the majority of English 
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industrial workers given the franchise,. By that time both the 
Conservative and Liberal parties (successors respectively of 
the Tories and Whigs) were competing for popular support. The 
1867 law was a relatively democratic measure which doubled the 
size of the electorate. Voting was still limited to property 
holders, however, and agricultural workers were still excluded 
from the franchise. Britain now had a government which, though 
predominantly aristocratic in leadership, was increasingly demc;-
jj£atic_at its base. 
Some Englishmen feared lest democratization had come too 
rapidly. "The common ordinary mind is quite unfit to fix for 
itself what political question it shall attend to," wrote the 
political essayist, Walter Bagehot (1826-1877). "It is for our 
principal statesmen to lead the public, and not to let the pub-
lic lead them," he insisted. Otherwise, Bagehot feared, English 
politics would descend into demagogy: "~ ~" 
In plain English, what I fear is that both our polit-
ical parties will bid for the support of the working-man; 
that both of them will promise to do as he likes if he 
will only tell them what it is; that, as he now holds the 
casting vote in our affairs, both parties will beg and 
pray him to give that vote to them.... Vox populi will 
be Vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner. 
Bagehot's alarm was not entirely groundless, since the problem 
he posed is one common to democratic polities and has not been 
satisfactorily resolved even in our own day. Yet, the legis-
lation of 1867, like that of 1832, served to ease the pressure 
for revolutionary reform in Britain, Another act in 1884 
granted the vote to agricultural laborers, and in Great Br_jtain 
democracy and liberal government continued to pursue evolution-
ary rather than revolutionary paths. 
Evolutionary development of democracy was perhaps best 
exemplified by the United States, where the Old World system of 
absolutism and privilege had never taken root. As a conse-
quence , the political institutions of thfi TIni ted-Httrtr'gr evolved 
with a nice balance between innovation and tradition, between 
liberty and law. As we noted in an earlier chapter, the Ameri-
can nation was born during the eighteenth century's emphasis on 
liberty, equality, and fraternity. The Constitution of 1787 set 
up republican institutions on a liberal foundation, but in the 
first half of the nineteenth century Americans argued, without 
reaching an agreement, whether their political experiment 
should be guided by an enlightened aristocracy or by an egali-
tarian democracy. 
From the beginning Alexander Hamilton (c. 1757-1804) and 
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) were the giant protagonists__£>f 
these opposing schools of thought. Coming to power in 1801, 
the Jeffersonians.initiated an atmosphere of political toler-
ance~"and faith in the common man. In t e r m s of £. later age their 
^At&°*»ic>- '^y^u*Y "fiiiuf&ty' ^c^jj^^t^*^^d^a^a- — - — ' — 
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program-was- moderate, and in some ways even slightly neoaristo-
cratic. By the 1830"s two transcendent social d^y^lopme^ts " 
drltstlcally altered American p o l i t i c ] theory and practice. 
•~TBe~~firstT~was the expanding frontier, which increased Western 
influence and introduced a rough and ready element into Ameri-
can democracy. The second development was the first blush of 
the IndustrialRevolution in America, which sharpened class-
consciousness in American life. During and after the presidency 
of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837) the United States experienced a 
great wave of social and political reform. taiggicaas turnf"* 
their backs on th e old "sjik, stor»ir-jnpr," plutocracy, eagerly em-
bracing free public education, a more extended franchise, a 
greaterhumanitarian concern fo]r^ 3ihe_janlie""rp and x_in^ 
one sectlon7~at least. hosiiliiylio3tegro sTavervT 
Yet, not every part of America welcomed either the theory 
or the practice of egalitarian democracy. To Southern planta-
tion owners the status quo seemed good, while the burgeoning 
democracy of the North and West aroused their distrust and 
alarm. The American Civil War (1861-1865) had many causes, 
including sectional economic rivalry, states rights, and the 
institution of slavery. To these perhaps should be added a 
disparate devotion to democratic principles existing in the 
North and the South. .Tohn r.a Calhoun (1782-1850) , the patron 
saint of Southern conservatism, entertained strong doubts re-
specting the desirability of majority rule. In contrast, 
Aferaham^Linooln (1809-1865) proclaimed his faith in "govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people." Even 
in the Northern states many neoaristocrats were skeptical of 
the ability of the masses to choose the right course in polit-
ical matters. However, the larger body of Northern opinion 
followed the line laid down by gifted writers such as Ralph 
Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) and Walt Whitman (1819-1892). 
There was much to criticize in American democracy as it 
had evolved by the middle of~the nineteenth century. Many of 
its weaknesses were caused, no doubt, Iqrthj inherent diTf~i=~*~ 
culty of making democracy work in a new 1apd among a practjcjj.1 
people engaged in turning, a wilderness into ITlHviiization^ 
The voice of the people was not always the voice of God. Yet, 
European observers such as France's Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-
1859) found much to admire in the American system. While the 
Civil War ended the debate over the form of the American gov-
ernment, it did not eliminate the weaknesses which often char-
acterize popular rule. In fact, it accentuated some old faults 
and produced new ones. Nevertheless, the survival of their 
constitutional union in the ordeal of civil strife reassured 
Americans that their political institutions were both the most 
ideal and practical which the world had even seen. The post-
Civiir-War years witnessed growing power and stability, all of 
which confirmed Americans in their self-esteem. 
Eastern Europe could hardly remain untouched by the liberal 
agitation of the midnineteenth century, and waves of reform 
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sentiment even lapjped over the boundaries &utQ the....Russian 
Empire,^ Ever since the collapse of the Decembrist movement in 
"TB25, educated and informed Russians chafed at the prevailing 
conditions, which compared unfavorably with those in the West. 
A collective sense of guilt and frustration pervaded the upper 
classes as they continually judged Russian society by the 
standards of Western liberal thought and yet found no constitu-
tional means of improving conditions. Some of this sentiment 
found an outlet in the remarkable literary productions of such 
men as Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) and Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883). 
Since the days of Peter the Great (1682-1725), the tsars 
had alternated hotwacn. reaction and reform. During tne nine-
t e e n t h century Alexander I, a sentimentaT~idealist for much of 
his reign, was followed by the reactionary Nicholas I, who in 
turn left the throne to his son, Alexander II (1855-1881). Un-
rest provoked by the unsuccessful Crimean War (1853-1856) led 
the second Alexander to grant moderate reforms as a means of 
allaying domestic grievances. For almost a decade the new 
tsar's policies earned him the sobriquet, "the reforming tsar." 
Nineteenth centu^y-~4tassia, was sti l-l-~pa?imarily an agrarian 
country in which ninety per cent of the soil was tilled by 
serfs. The lot of these downtrodden people, under the complete 
"dveriordship of the great noble landowners, was sorry in the 
extreme. In addition, serfdom meant primitive and wasteful 
methods of farming and explains in large measure the economic 
backwardness of the country. Alexander began his reforms by 
freeing the serfs in 1861 — a qualified emancipation in that 
the serfs were to compensate their former owners -- just as the 
American Civil War began. In 1864, the tsar authorized the 
formation of provincial assemblies, the zemstvos, in which a 
degree of local self-government was granted. Finally, Alexan-
der undertook to reform the Russian judicial system, modeling 
the courts after those in Western Europe, codifying the laws, 
providing for jury trial in criminal cases, and, except for 
political offenses, holding trials in public. Russian liberals 
greeted these reforms as preliminary to the establishment of a 
constitutional and parliamentary regime. 
After a decade of mild reform Alexander turned consf?rYatiYn 
The concessions he had granted had been, in most cases, an im-
pulsive response to the criticisms leveled by the Westernizers 
among his people. Opposed to them were the Slavophiles, who 
believed _that Russian culture was superior to that of the West 
and wished to keep their country aloof irom tne 11Serai cur-
rents washing over the Western World. When rebellions broke 
out once more in Poland in 1863, conservatives persuaded the 
tsar that his leniency was responsible for the insurrections. 
Several attempts on his life and the sheer magnitude of the 
task of reform further weakened Alexander's devotion to change, 
and from 1865 on he matched his predecessors in his reactionary 
policy. He reimposed rigid press censorship and strengthened 
his control of the central government. In 1881, Alexander fell 
a victim to the assassin's bomb, and under his son and successor 
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Russia became a stronghold of reaction. 
Varying gestures_toward liheralism in government took, 
place in the smaller Estates of jfcostern ^irope-Jbetween 1848 and 
J871. Following the separaTiion of the Netherlands and Belgium 
in 1831, the economically advanced and politically progressive 
Belgians enjoyed a liberal constitutional government under 
Leopold I (1831-1865) and his successors. In both the Nether-
lands and Denmark the restiveness of 1848 had persuaded their 
respective monarchs to accede to popular demands for parlia-
mentary government. The vote and the right to hold office in 
these states were still restricted to propertyholders, yet 
their governments were liberal to the extent that they were 
constitutional. Even in conservative Sweden the king heeded 
public clamor, and in 1866 consented to political reform. 
Swiss liberals used force to compel the seven conservatively 
ruled cantons to adopt constitutions, expel religious orders, 
and consent to a closer union of all the Swiss cantons (1847-
1848), 
In Spain the corrupt and incompetent reign of Queen 
Isabella II (1833-1868) closed in a revolution which forced 
her from the throne. The following year a democratically 
elected constituent assembly adopted a new constitution which 
promised individual liberties and provided for a parliament 
chosen by popular vote. Henceforth, Spanish monarchs were to 
have but limited authority, much as those in Great Britain. 
Although this new political arrangement did not bring liberal-
ism immediately or permanently to Spain, it placed the nation 
in the company of other states and seemed to mark the direc-
tion in which Spanish public opinion was tending. Elsewhere 
on the Iberian peninsula, the form, at least, of liberal and 
parliamentary government was maintained in Portugal, 
In summary, political liberalism had made definite gains 
kX--1&2J-J- but its most striking successes had come in those 
states which had functioned under constitutional government 
before 1815, In Great Britain and the United States parlia-
mentary institutions were strong and stable. It is perhaps 
significant that liberalism's greatest achievements were found 
in these two commonwealths which had acquired a large degree of 
national cohesion and unity even before, and an expanding in-
dustrial and urban economy during, the nineteenth century. 
However, political liberals had realized but limited objectives 
elsewhere, and hardly any of them in the regions east of the 
Rhine. Liberalism had but a precarious hold in Spain; Germany 
and Italy were subordinating 11 €v~ a nationalistic Realpolitik; -
wjiat small degree remained in the Austrian Empire and in R u s s i a ^ ^ * ^ ^R 
was on the wft,n~r» gfld even in revolution-prone France liberal">6</-7% 
government faltered under Napoleon III. Yet, conservatives-' 
could not rest easy. A more formidable adversary of the status 
quo was rising. Aite_r__184S, a new version of an old creed, 
militant nationalism, came to dominate European attitudes to an 
e~TtelfE never realized by political liberalism during the nine-
